Market Competition: Policy and Regulation
Etablissement : ESPOL European School of Political and Social Sciences
Langue : Anglais
Formation(s) dans laquelle/lesquelles le cours apparait :
Période : S2
In the EU we live in an open market economy where there is free competition: companies are the ones that, in competition with each other, produce goods and deliver services in response to consumer demand. However, companies do not do so in a vacuum, but they operate within a framework that incentivizes them to behave in certain ways, and that punishes them if their actions are illegal. But what are the policies behind such framework? Why is competition heavily regulated in some markets and less in others? Why do governments decide to shape or intervene in markets in certain ways?
In this seminar, we will study how market competition works by looking into the policies underpinning competition and market regulation. To this end, we will dive into the most prominent schools of thought that have informed competition policies over the years. This includes exploring juridical practice, laws as well as some economic concepts that all together form the core of any competition policy. The focus of the seminar is placed on the EU, although we may make some references to other jurisdictions to better understand the EU’s approach to market competition.
Session 1 – Intervening (or not) in markets: Schools of Thought
In addition to seeing basic concepts of market competition, in this introductory session we will approach competition policy and market regulation by looking at the most important intellectual discourses that have shaped market competition over the past century: the Harvard and Chicago Schools, and Ordoliberalism. We will also see the new trends with the New Brandeis Movement. The discussion in this session will set the theoretical framework for the rest of the seminar.
Mandatory readings:
– Crane, Daniel A. ‘A Premature Postmortem on the Chicago School of Antitrust’. Business History Review 93, no. 4 (2019): 759–76.
– Warlouzet, Laurent. ‘Towards a Fourth Paradigm in European Competition Policy? A Historical Perspective (1957-2023)’. In The Transformation of EU Competition Law – Next Generation Issues, edited by Adina Claici, Assimakis Komninos, and Denis Waelbroeck. Kluwer, 2023. https://ssrn.com/abstract=4426768
Voluntary readings:
– Akman, P., & Kassim, H. (2010). Myths and Myth-Making in the European Union: The Institutionalization and Interpretation of EU Competition Policy. Journal of Common Market Studies, 48(1), 111–132
– Witt, A. C. (2012). Public Policy Goals Under EU Competition Law—Now Is the Time to Set the House in Order. European Competition Journal, 8(3), 443–471.
– Crane, D. (2019). How much Brandeis do the Neo-brandeisians want? The Antitrust Bulletin, 64(4), 531–539.
– Foster, C., & Thelen, K. (2024). Brandeis in Brussels? Bureaucratic discretion, social learning, and the development of regulated competition in the European Union. Regulation & Governance, 18(4), 1083–1103.
– Buch-Hansen, H., & Wigger, A. (2010). Revisiting 50 Years of Market-Making: The Neoliberal Transformation of European Competition Policy. Review of International Political Economy, 17(1), 20–44.
Session 2 – Taming monopolies (I)
Monopolies can be good for societies: they have the capability and capacity to invest resources into R&D and provide consumers with innovative products. However, they can also pose a problem if their behaviour results in excluding competitors and exploiting consumers. This first session about monopolies is devoted to see some key principles of monopoly policies.
Mandatory readings:
– ‘Are Google and Facebook Monopolies?’ Chicago Booth Review, 22 January 2018. https://www.chicagobooth.edu/review/are-google-and-facebook-monopolies
– Economist. ‘Too Much of a Good Thing’. 26 March 2016. http://www.economist.com/ news/briefing/21695385-profits-are-too-high-america-needs-giant-dose-competition-too- much-good-thing . Permalink: [https://perma.cc/FV6K-797F]
Voluntary readings:
– Monti, Giorgio. ‘The Concept of Dominance in Article 82’. European Competition Journal 2, no. Suppl. 1 (2006): 31–52.
– Crane, D. A. (2020). Fascism and Monopoly. Michigan Law Review, 118(7), 1315–1370.
– Kahn, L. M., & Vaheesan, S. (2017). Market power and inequality: The antitrust counterrevolution and its discontents. Harvard Law & Policy Review, 11, 235.
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